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decedent purchased several single-premium annuity contracts, the annuity payments to be made to her for life, and after her death to a designated second
annuitant for life. The Board of Tax Appeals ruled that the policy should not
be taxed as a transfer to take effect at death.1 Held, on appeal, the interest
passing to the second anuitant at the death of the decedent should be included in
decedent's gross estate under the federal estate tax, since it falls within the provision taxing transfers intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after the death of the transferor. 2 Commissioner v. Clise, (C. C. A. 9th, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 998.
The federal estate tax is a tax imposed upon the privilege of transferring
property at death,3 and the section of the statute taxing transfers intended to
take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after the death of the transferor
is designed to prevent evasions of the estate tax by inter vivos transfers testamentary in character. 4 The section is unfortunate in its phraseology, for it defies
accurate definition or predictable application. 5 In May v. Heiner 6 the Supreme

41 B. T. A. 820 (1940).
53 Stat. L. 121 (1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § Su (c).
3 Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929); Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S.
384, 42 S. Ct. 324 (1922).
4 Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565 (1938). See Knouff,
"Death Taxes on Completed Transfers Inter Vivas," 36 M1cH. L. REv. 1284 (1938).
5 In applying the section the courts could examine the actual intent of the transferor in making the transfer, or they could look solely to the objective character of the
transfer. Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 57 S. Ct. 461 (1927), would seem to be
authority that the subjective approach has been rejected. A further question might be
asked as to whether the "taking effect in possession and enjoyment" is a legal concept
having reference to the time of vesting in interest or whether it is a layman's concept
having reference to the time of the actual physical enjoyment of the property transferred. In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 545, 59 S. Ct. 123 (1927), a
transfer in trust with the income during the life of the settlor given to one beneficiary,
and the remainder at his death to another, was held not to be taxable as a gift to take
effect at death. It would seem, therefore, that the shifting of physical enjoyment of a
transfer at the death of the transferor alone is not sufficient to render the transfer
taxable.
6 281 U. S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930). This case may be overruled today. See
Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U. S. 531, 61 S. Ct. 646 (1941); Estate of Mary H.
Hughes, 44 B. T. A. 1196, No. 184 (1941); l PAuL,FEDERALESTATEANDG1FTTAXTION, § 7.15 (1942). On facts identical to the ones in the principal case, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilder's
Estate, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) II8 F. (2d) 281, held the annuity taxable under the
broad provisions of § Su (c) "To the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise ••• intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."
1
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RECENT DECISIONS

Court held that the statute, as it then read,7 was inapplicable to a transfer in
trust with a life income retained by the settlor. To avoid the effect of this decision, and three subsequent cases in accord with it,8 Congress on March 3, 1931,
amended this section of the act so as to tax transfers in which the transferor
retained an interest. 9 It seems clear that a purchase of an annuity is a "transfer
by trust or otherwise" under the act,10 so that the first real question is whether
the purchaser has retained "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the
income from, the property" (money) given as consideration for the annuity.
It has been indicated that the payment of money or other property in consideration for the annuity policy, and the payments received in return are entirely
separate, so that the latter are in no way received as income from or enjoyment
of the former, 11 although the court in the principal case held contra, saying that
in an economic sense the purchaser retained the benefits for her life and at the
same time made provision for the objects of her bounty.12 Although the con7
" • • • the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property ... (c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer •.. intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death . . . ." Revenue Act of 1919, §
402, 40 Stat. L. 1097 (1918).
8
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 51 S. Ct. 342 (1931); Mersman
v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783, 51 S. Ct. 343 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S.
784, 51 S. Ct. 343 (1931).
9
The section now reads: "To the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise ... intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, or of which he has at any time
made a transfer by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death ( l) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right
to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom .•.•" 53 Stat. L. 121 (1939), 26 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), §
8 II ( c). Before the passage of this amendment, annuity policies similar to that of the
principal case were held not to be taxable. Security Trust & Savings Bank, l l B. T. A.
833 (1928). See also Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 37 B. T. A. 535 (1938), distinguished by the court in the principal case on the ground that the annuity policies
were taken out by the decedent before the passage of the amendment.
10
Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 61 S. Ct. 646 (1941); Keller's Estate
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U. S. 543, 61 S. Ct. 651 (1941); Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F.
(2d) 380. See Meisenholder, "Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estate and Inheritance Taxes," 39 MxcH. L. REv. 856 at 892 (1941).
11
See In re Honeyman's Estate, 98 N. J. Eq. 638,129 A. 393 (1925), affirmed
sub nom. Bugbee v. Board of Home Missions, 4 N. J. Misc. 99, 131 A. 924 (1926),
affirmed 103 N. J. L. 173, 143 A. 915 (1926).
12
Principal case, 122 F. (2d) 998 at 1003. The commercial annuity in the
principal case can be distinguished from the annuity in In re Honeyman's Estate, 98
N. J. Eq. 638, 129 A. 393 (1925). There the transferor gave away real estate and
received therefor a promise of annuity payments worth but a fraction of the realty.
The argument that there was a gift of the remainder of the property and a retention
of a life income and that the gift of the remainder should be taxed as a gift to take
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nection between the consideration paid l:\nd the installments received is not
immediate, still it is sufficiently present to satisfy the statutory language in view
of the Supreme Court's tendency to construe the taxing statutes broadly.13 The
court in the principal case also said that since the enjoyment by the second
annuitant is contingent upon survival of the first annuitant and the death of
the latter removed this contingency, the annuity is taxable under the rule of
Helvering v. Hallock,14 which held a transfer by means of an irrevocable trust
to be taxable as a transfer intended to take effect at death where the settlor
retained a right of reverter if he should survive a named beneficiary. It is not
entirely clear that the rule of the Hallock case should be applied to the principal
case, for while the interest of the second annuitant is conditioned upon survivorship to the same extent as were the contingent interests in the Hallock case, here
there was no chance that the first annuitant or his estate would be enriched by
prior decease of the first annuitant, as was true of the grantor in the Hallock
case. It would seem that this difference is sufficient to bring a contrary result.
However, this money should be taxed on the ground that possession and enjoyment had been retained by decedent during his lifetime.15
Charles J. O'Laughlin

effect at death was rejected by the court. There the transfer sought to be taxed
was one between the transferor of the property and the transferee, and in the case
of a commercial annuity the transfer sought to be taxed is the transfer between the
transferor and the second annuitant at the death of the transferor.
13 With the death of the first annuitant, the enjoyment of the economic benefits
is transferred to the second annuitant. The argument might be made that this is a
transfer intended to take effect at death (see note 5, supra), but this test seems to be
rejected in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 545, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1927).
However, this shifting of economic benefits at death was sufficient to uphold the constitutionality of the section of the statute which taxes insurance policies, the premiums
of which have been paid by the decedent who retained no further interest in the
policies. Bailey v. United States, (Ct. Ql. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 778.
14 309 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
15 See Meisenholder, "Taxation of Annuity Contracts Under Estate and Inheritance Taxes," 39 MICH. L. REv. 856 at 904 (1941). See also I PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 7.18 (1942).

